Government by regulation is the normal way in which we do business in constitutional democracies. We meet in legislatures, through our representatives, in order to decide on public policy and the best course of action to meet our problems and challenges. When we reach a broad enough consensus, or when we are tired of talking and take a vote, we make laws and all sorts of rules destined to govern ourselves—that is, to define as clearly as possible what we owe to each other. We do this through the legislature and administrative agencies created by law. Threats of regulation are part of that process. When our representatives, or their appointees, want a change in the world, they may threaten those subject to their jurisdiction with making new rules if they fail to change their ways. This traditional mechanism through which power is exercised poses challenges to the rule of law model of democratic rule-making, that assumes an accountable, transparent, and responsive legislature deliberating openly in front of the people themselves. This is so because threats of regulation—or jawboning, as it has often been called—can escape some of the constraints of the rule of law model. Under certain circumstances, it may benefit regulators and those regulated alike. This paper conceptualizes threats of a regulation as a specific mechanism of power, that has a special salience on Internet governance.